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We present a scheme for multiparty quantum secret sharing of a private key with pure entangled
states and decoy photons. The boss, say Alice uses the decoy photons, which are randomly in
one of the four nonorthogonal single-photon states, to prevent a potentially dishonest agent from
eavesdropping freely. This scheme requires the parties of communication to have neither an ideal
single-photon quantum source nor a maximally entangled one, which makes this scheme more conve-
nient than others in a practical application. Moreover, it has the advantage of having high intrinsic
efficiency for qubits and exchanging less classical information in principle.
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The principles in quantum mechanics, such as the uncertain relation, the correlation of entangled quantum systems
and the collapse in quantum measurement, provide some novel ways for secure communication. For instance, quantum
key distribution (QKD), whose goal is used to create a private key between two authorized users, has become one of the
most mature applications of quantum information techniques [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. The noncloning theorem forbids a
vicious eavesdropper, say Eve, to eavesdrop the quantum information transmitted through a quantum channel freely.
The action of Eve will inevitably disturb the quantum systems transmitted and leave a trace in the outcomes obtained
by the receiver. The two authorized parties can find out Eve’s eavesdropping by comparing a subset of the outcomes
in public. This principle has been also applied to other branches of quantum communication, such as quantum secure
direct communication[9, 10, 11], deterministic quantum communication [12, 13, 14, 15], quantum secret report [16],
quantum broadcast communication[17], quantum secret conference [18], quantum dialogue [19], and so on.
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is the quantum counterpart of the classical secret sharing. In a secret sharing, a
boss, say Alice, has two agents (Bob and Charlie) who are at a remote place, and she wants to send her instruction to
her agents for dealing with her business. However Alice suspects that one of her agents may be dishonest, and she does
not know who is the dishonest one. Alice believes that the honest one can keep the potentially dishonest from doing
harm to her benefits if they both coexist in the process of the business. For the security of the secret message, say
MA, Alice will divide it into two pieces, MB and MC , and then sends them to Bob and Charlie, respectively. If and
only if Bob and Charlie cooperate, they can read out the messageMA =MB⊕MC ; otherwise none can obtain a useful
information about the secret message. As classical signal is in the eigenvectors of a quantum operator, it can be copied
freely and fully. That is to say, it is impossible in principle to share a secret message with classical physics. When
quantum mechanics enters the field of information, the story is changed. In 1999, Hillery, Buzˇek and Berthiaume
(HBB99) [20] proposed an original QSS scheme for creating a private key among three parties with a three-particle
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state |GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉), the maximally entangled three-particle state.
Here |0〉 and |1〉 are the two eigenvectors of the measuring basis (MB) Z (for example the z-direction of 1/2-spin).
Now, there are a great number of QSS schemes, such as the schemes [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33]
for creating a private key and those [34, 35, 36, 37] for sharing an unknown quantum state.
Almost all the existing QSS schemes are based on either maximally entangled quantum signals [20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28] or an ideal single-photon quantum signal [29, 30, 31, 32, 33], which makes them difficult in a practical
application. On one hand, a practical ideal single-photon source cannot be obtained with present techniques although
people can in principle produce a single photon. On the other hand, an entangled source usually generates a pure
entangled state because of the property of asymmetry in the source.
In this paper, we will present a scheme for quantum secret sharing with pure entangled states, not maximally entan-
gled ones. The boss Alice exploits some decoy photons to forbid a potentially dishonest agent to steal the information
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2about the private key obtained by another agent. This scheme has the advantage of having high intrinsic efficiency for
qubits and exchanging little classical information. Moreover, it does not require the parties of communication to have
an ideal single-photon quantum source, which is not available in a practical application with the present techniques,
or a maximally entangled quantum source. Thus this QSS scheme is more convenient than others.
Now, let us describe the principle of our QSS scheme. For simplicity, we first describe it with two agents, i.e., Bob
and Charlie, and then generalize it to the case with N agents. For the case with two agents, Alice should first prepare
a sequence of pure entangled photon pairs S. Each pair is in one of the four states {|φ〉BC , |φ′〉BC , |ψ〉BC , |ψ′〉BC}.
|φ〉BC = (α|00〉+ β|11〉)BC , (1)
|φ′〉BC = (α|11〉+ β|00〉)BC , (2)
|ψ〉BC = (α|01〉+ β|10〉)BC , (3)
|ψ′〉BC = (α|10〉+ β|01〉)BC , (4)
where
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1. (5)
Suppose that Alice’s entangled source produces an entangled pair in the state |φ〉BC = (α|00〉 + β|11〉)BC in each
signal interval, Alice can obtain the entangled pair sequence S by operating some of the pairs with the two unitary
operations U0 = |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| and U1 = |1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1|, i.e.,
|φ′〉BC = (UB1 ⊗ UC1 )|φ〉BC , (6)
|ψ〉BC = (UB0 ⊗ UC1 )|φ〉BC , (7)
|ψ′〉BC = (UB1 ⊗ UC0 )|φ〉BC . (8)
Alice divides the sequence S into two sequences SB and SC . The sequence SB is made up of all the B photons of
the photon pairs in the sequence S. All the C photons compose of the partner particle sequence SC , similar to Refs.
[7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Different from the Karlsson-Koashi-Imoto (KKI) QSS scheme [21], the quantum information
carries in this scheme are a sequence of pure entangled stats. The photon B and the photon C in a pure entangled state
are completely correlated when they are measured with the MB Z, but not with the MB X = {|±x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉±|1〉)}.
For instance,
|φ〉BC = (α|00〉+ β|11〉)BC = 1
2
[(α+ β)(|+ x〉| + x〉+ | − x〉| − x〉)
+(α− β)(|+ x〉| − x〉 + | − x〉|+ x〉)]. (9)
That is, on one hand, the security of the quantum secret sharing with pure entangled states is lower than that with Bell
states if the parties use the two MBs Z and X to measure their photon pairs for the eavesdropping check directly [12].
On the other hand, the quantum source is more convenient than maximally entangled states [12] as the asymmetry
in a practical quantum source makes the photon pairs in a pure entangled state, not a maximally one.
For ensuring the security of the transmission of the photon sequences SB and SC , Alice should add some decoy
photons in these two sequences before she sends SB and SC to Bob and Charlie, respectively. The decoy photon
technique was proposed first by Li et al. [38, 39] in QKD network, and now it has been applied to other branches of
quantum communication, such as deterministic secure quantum communication [12], quantum secret report [16] and
quantum secret conference [18]. The principle of the decoy photon technique is that Alice prepares some photons which
are randomly in one of the four nonorthogonal states {|0〉, |1〉, |+ x〉, | − x〉} and then inserts them into the sequences
SB and SC . As the states and the positions of the decoy photons are unknown for all the parties of the communication
except for Alice herself, the eavesdropping done by an eavesdropper will inevitably disturb these decoy photons and
will be detected, similar to Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [2] and its modified version [8]. The number of the
decoy photons is not required to be very large, just large enough for checking eavesdropping. Still, it is unnecessary
for Alice to prepare her decoy photons with an ideal single-photon source. She can get them by measuring the photon
B in a pure entangled state |φ〉BC and manipulating the other photon C with some unitary operations. For example,
if Alice wants to make her decoy photon in the state | + x〉, she measures the photon B in the pure entangled state
|φ〉BC with the MB Z and then performs a Hadamard (H) operation on the photon C when she obtains the outcome
|0〉B, otherwise she performs the operation H⊗U1 on the photon C. Here H = (1/
√
2)(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|− |1〉〈1|).
As the analysis of the decoy photons is as same as that in the BB84 QKD protocol [2], our QSS scheme is secure if
Alice exploits her decoy photons to forbid the potentially dishonest agent to eavesdrop freely.
Suppose that Alice codes the states {|φ〉BC , |φ′〉}BC as 0 and codes the states {|ψ〉BC , |ψ′〉BC} as 1. Our three-party
QSS scheme with pure entangled states can work with following steps.
3(S1) Alice prepares a sequence of pure entangled two-photon states S, N ordered photon pairs. Each photon pair
BC is randomly in one of the four states {|φ〉BC , |φ′〉BC , |ψ〉BC , |ψ′〉BC}. She divides the sequence S into two partner
particle sequences SB and SC . The sequence SB (SC) is made up of the photons B (C) in the ordered N photon pairs.
Alice prepares 2k (k << N) decoy photons by measuring the photons B in some photon pairs BC and operating
the remaining photons C with the two unitary operations Ui (i = 0, 1) and the H operation. She inserts randomly k
decoy photons into the sequence SB and the other k decoy photons into the sequence SC .
(S2) Alice sends the sequence SB and SC to Bob and Charlie, respectively.
(S3) Bob and Charlie measure their photons in the sequences SB and SC independently with the two MBs Z and
X .
If Bob and Charlie have the capability of storing their quantum states, they can measure their photons in the
sequences SB and SC in the same way as those in Refs. [9, 10]. That is, Alice first tells Bob and Charlie which are the
decoy photons and their states, and then Bob and Charlie measure the decoy photons with the same MBs as those
used by Alice for preparing them. For the other photons, Bob and Charlie both choose the MB Z to measure them.
In this way, all the decoy photons can be used for checking eavesdropping. The k decoy photons in the sequence SB
(SC) can be used to check the security of Alice-Bob (Alice-Charlie) quantum line in the same way as the BB84 QKD
protocol [2] which has been proven to be secure for generating a private key [40].
Without quantum memory, Bob (Charlie) can measure the photons in the sequence SB (SC) in the same way as
that used in the modified BB84 QKD protocol [8]. That is to say, Bob (Charlie) measures his photons by using the
MB X with the probability p (p << 1/2 if N is large enough) and the MB Z with the probability 1− p. In this way,
half the decoy photons measured by Bob (Charlie) in the sequence SB (SC) are useful for checking eavesdropping as
the MBs for preparing and measuring them are the same ones. In this time, Alice and Bob (Alice and Charlie) can
analyze the error rate of the decoy photons in the sequence SB (SC) with the refined analysis technique discussed in
the modified BB84 QKD protocol [8]. In detail, they divide the useful decoy photons into two groups, the one they
both choose the MB Z and the other one they both choose the MB X . They analyze the error rates of these two
groups independently. When the error rates of the two groups of decoy photons both are lower than the threshold ηt,
Alice believes that the transmission between her and her agents is secure or the information leaked to a potentially
dishonest agent is negligible.
(S4) If Alice confirms that the two quantum lines, i.e., Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie, both are secure, Alice and her
agents distill a private key KA = KB ⊕KC with the other outcomes they all choose the MB Z, similar to QKD [1];
otherwise they repeat their QSS from the beginning. Here KA, KB and KC are the key obtained by Alice, Bob and
Charlie, respectively.
As pointed out in Ref. [21], a QSS scheme is secure if it can prevent the potentially dishonest agent from eaves-
dropping freely. In this QSS scheme, Alice exploits her decoy photons to forbid her agents to eavesdrop freely. As
the states and the positions of the decoy photons are unknown for Bob and Charlie, either Bob or Charlie will be
detected if he wants to steal the information about the key obtained by the other agent. Thus this QSS scheme can
be made to be secure. On the other hand, as the agents choose the MB Z with a lager probability 1− p to measure
their photons used for creating the private key, the intrinsic efficiency of qubits ηq ≡ quqt is far larger than that in KKI
QSS scheme [21] as p is much smaller than 1/2. Here qu is the number of the useful qubits and qt is that of the total
qubits transmitted.
It is straightforward to generalize this scheme to the case with M agents, say Bobi (i = 1, 2, · · · ,M). Similar to the
case with two agents, Alice prepares a sequence of pure entangled M -photon quantum systems S′ (ordered N pure
entangled quantum systems), and each quantum system is randomly in one of the four states {|Φ〉, |Φ′〉, |Ψ〉, |Ψ′〉}.
Here
|Φ〉B1B2···BM = (α|00 · · · 0〉+ β|11 · · · 1〉)B1B2···BM , (10)
|Φ′〉B1B2···BM = (α|11 · · · 1〉+ β|00 · · · 0〉)B1B2···BM , (11)
|Ψ〉B1B2···BM = (α|00 · · · 1〉+ β|11 · · · 0〉)B1B2···BM , (12)
|Ψ′〉B1B2···BM = (α|11 · · · 0〉+ β|00 · · · 1〉)B1B2···BM . (13)
Alice divides the sequence S′ into M partner photon sequences S′B1 , S
′
B2
, · · ·, and S′BM . The sequence of S′i (i =
1, 2, · · · ,M) is made up of the photons Bi in all the ordered quantum systems. Also Alice insets randomly k decoy
photons, which are prepared by measuring a photon in a pure entangled state and operating the remaining photons
with unitary operations U0, U1 and H , into each partner photon sequence Si before she sends it to the agent Bobi.
If all the agents have the capability of storing their quantum states, Alice first tells the agents which are the decoy
photons and their states in the partner photon sequences when all the agents have received their sequences, and then
the agents measure the decoy photons with the same MBs as those used by Alice for preparing them and measure all
the pure entangled states with the MB Z. Without quantum memory, the agents should measure their photons in
the same way as the case with two agents. That is, all the agents measure their photons by using the MB X with a
4small probability p and the MB Z with the probability 1 − p. In this time, the rate of the useful qubits to all those
transmitted is pu = (1− p)M . As the same as the case with two agents, the security of each of the partner photons Si
is ensured by the decoy photons, the same as the BB84 QKD protocol [2] or its modified version [8]. In other words,
this QSS scheme with N agents can be made to be secure.
As proven by Deng et al. [41] that the one-way QSS schemes based on entanglement and a collective eavesdropping
check, such as the two famous QSS schemes, the HBB99 QSS scheme and the KKI QSS scheme, are insecure with a lossy
quantum channel if the parties only exploit the correlation of the entangled quantum systems to check eavesdropping,
this QSS scheme is an optimal one. It has the following advantages obviously: (a) The quantum signals are a sequence
of pure entangled states, not maximally entangled ones, which makes it more convenient than others in a practical
application. (b) The boss Alice exploits some decoy photons to ensure the security of this scheme, which is just
the requirement of a secure one-way QSS scheme based on entanglement and a collective eavesdropping check in a
practical application [41]. (c) It requires the boss has neither an ideal single-photon quantum signal source nor a
maximally entangled source. (d) It does not requires the parties exchange a large number of classical information as
the agents choose a large probability to measure their photons with the MB Z. (e) Its intrinsic efficiency for qubits
is very high, approaching 100% when the number of bits in the private key KA is large enough.
In conclusion, we have presented a QSS scheme with pure entangled states and decoy photons. As this scheme
requires the parties to have neither an ideal single-photon quantum source nor a maximally entangle one, it is more
convenient in a practical application than others. Whether the agents have quantum memory or not, this scheme
has the advantage of having a high intrinsic efficiency for qubits and exchanging little classical information. For a
one-way QSS based on entanglement and a collective eavesdropping check, it is useful for the boss Alice to make at
least the qubits used for checking eavesdropping in single-particle states, not entangled ones [41]. Thus this scheme
with decoy photons is an optimal one.
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